Interview with Van Vuuren Print
Van Vuuren
 
 Head of Institute of security Studies (ISS Africa)
 
May 2006
 
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Hennie Van Vuuren is programme head of the Corruption and Governance Programme  at the ISS, an applied policy research NGO focused on supporting and enhancing the debate on human security issues  on the African continent: including organised crime, money laundering, corruption and governance across the African continent. ISS has offices in Cape Town, Pretoria, Addis Ababa and Nairobi .
 

South Africa is about to accede to the OECD convention. What effect will this have?

Strictly, it won’t have any effect. The South African corruption legislation was recently completely revised and the “Preventing and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act” - a new law - came into effect in April 2004. One of the elements (that ISS pushed for) was that South Africa should include a clause that outlaws bribery of foreign public officials. There won’t be a change in legislation, but the review process that comes with OECD convention by other signatories will be an important addition. It also provides South African civil society with a framework within which to monitor the implementation of this law.

When corruption occurs, company agents are frequently the conduits for such behaviour. There needs to be much stronger control of corporations in the way they are able to make use of agents. They cannot wash their hands of the problem

Do you think that parliamentary oversight of the South African defence procurement process is effective?

Yes and no. South Africa learnt a difficult lesson from the arms procurement package ($5bn) of the late 1990s. The political fallout from the related corruption scandal was huge. Civil Society, the media and opposition parties were made aware of the need to monitor for corruption. The ruling party is now very sensitive to issues of corruption in procurement, and this keeps the parliamentary committee on its toes. However, one of the problems the defence parliamentary oversight committee experiences is rapid turnover of portfolio committee members. Consequently, there isn’t always sufficient institutional memory. A strong research and policy-making component that assists the portfolio committee would help to address this problem. South Africa also has a proportional list system, so there is always the added additional risk that some MP’s may be reluctant to expose corruption where this involves senior members of their party – and run the risk of being excluded from the parties candidate list for the next election.

How has the public been affected by the scandal?

The impact has been massive. It has imprinted in the public psyche the notion of grand corruption – the first big scandal of its kind in a democratic post-apartheid society-, and for many ordinary South Africans, the fact that many high level officials were implicated and prosecuted means that there has been some justice-in action. It has also tested the mettle of many of the country’s anti-corruption agencies that have had to investigate this.

Is the “North” getting tough enough with its exporting companies yet?

“Northern” companies are feeding the problem on a daily basis. The fact that the (OECD) convention is in place, and that there is monitoring of it is good, but the number of prosecutions is hopelessly low. It is very difficult to prosecute foreign corruption, and there is a lack of will in many countries to prosecute large multinationals engaged in corruption in developing countries. Although many Africans recognises that more has to be done  to hold our own political leaders to account, there is no sense that in the “North” there is the same urgency to deal with the supply of bribes by big arm companies. A revealing example is the case of a leading European company (Thales) which has escaped the Zuma scandal so far: it is alleged that bribes occurred before the Convention entered into force in French domestic legislation. What is immensely important, though, is that the South African Authorities are now moving towards prosecuting this company. Will the French do the same?

Do you have any comments on defence company agents?

When corruption occurs, company agents are frequently the conduits for such behaviour. There needs to be much stronger control of corporations in the way they are able to make use of agents. Because for instance South African defence firms such as Denel receive so much state funding, this is even more important.

Might the South African government consider partial debarment as a credible threat to punish companies for corrupt behaviour?

The new South African corruption law allows for tough debarment penalties – up to twenty years. That said, a leading South African company Denel has recently paid the price of any corrupt activity (as yet unproved), as the Indian government has disqualified it from any future contracts. In terms of prosecution, ideally the company should be held accountable, however this predates the new SA corruption Act and it is therefore unlikely that Denel will be debarred. At the very least the appropriate employees should be investigated and and fired if they have breached Denels internal code of conduct. This should go all the way to the top.

John Githongo has referred to the security sector as increasingly the last refuge of the corrupt in Africa. Is this true?

This is the case for both the security and the natural resource sector. There is a sense that the security sector is kept veiled from public sight because of ostensible national security considerations. Thus, the security sector often lies beyond the ability of civil society and others to exercise effective oversight over it.

Are developed countries doing all they can to help repatriate funds and extradite corrupt leaders?

The UN Convention provides a framework for “Northern” countries to start assisting through technical assistance, but the experience of many African countries (including Nigeria) is that the process remains extremely tricky. Whether or not rich countries are prepared to open up those bank accounts and make sure that Africa’s stolen wealth is returned will be a true test of the “north’s” commitment to the UN Convention. The urgency of the Nairobi declaration made by TI chapters in Africa no less than two months ago on the issue, points towards the fact that too little is being done to repatriate Africa’s stolen wealth.