Interview with John Githongo

John Githongo

Fellow, St Anthony’s College, Oxford University

Former Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics, Kenya

June 2006

John Githongo left his position of Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics of Kenya in 2005 after his attempts to root out grand corruption in the Kibaki government were obstructed and met with increasing hostility. Mr Githongo now resides at Oxford University, from where he published his dossier detailing corruption and bribery schemes in the Kenyan government.

Tell us about your work now.

Right now I’m involved in a publishing project, a book I’ve been working on, that’s been going quite well. In addition I’m doing a lot of speaking engagements.

You have referred to the security sector (and the extractive industries) as the last refuge of grand corruption in Africa. Why is this so?

Taking a historical perspective, in the 1960s and 1970s, after independence, most African countries inherited a state of affairs characterised by extreme inequality, and to counter this, governments assumed a big role in the market. Governments sensed that this was important to stop large multinationals from taking over. By the early 1980s, this intervention was characterised by corruption and inefficiency.

By the late 1980s, the World Bank was pushing for liberalisation and macro stability. By the 1990s, Africa was awash with imports, corruption and liberalisation made state intervention less lucrative than before, and corruption moved to trade, especially revenue collection.

By the end of the 1990s, the oversight of increasingly empowered civil society, media and parliamentary committees led to a greater interest in how money was being spent. This was a vast improvement.

However, official secrets acts in Africa remained in place and untouched since their creation in the colonial era, with a resulting lack of accountability in the security sector. In many African countries, the president exerts sole discretion over the security and defence sector. Corruption has been squeezed into this corner. In a positive sense, it’s a retreat.

"Where corruption is concerned, the security sector is the elephant in the room. They think, 'That is the one thing we can’t look at'"

- John Githongo

What can African government do to keep their systems from being overwhelmed by bribery attempts by arms companies?

In the case of grand corruption involving defence contractors, African governments are never ‘overwhelmed’. It is always a strictly managed series of transactions with all the top people complicit. If they want to stop it they can do so with a snap of their fingers. Governments are never overwhelmed, they are willing participants.

How can corruption in defence procurement in Africa be addressed?

The big bribes have been on the big ticket items. Typically, African countries don’t have the money up-front for big-ticket items, therefore to deal with corruption in these transactions, the best route is to focus on the financing mechanisms and arrangements: Who is paying for it? How? How long is the loan for? Focus on payment of consultancy fees around the financing arrangement. Sometimes the financing entity is dubious and may not even exist. Right now there is little or no parliamentary oversight over this. Any injection of transparency would have a positive impact.

How can the problem of corruption being routed through agents be dealt with?

Transparency. “Who are these agents”? Right now they remain shadowy figures. In particular who are the brokers for the Ukrainians and the Russians?

An interesting approach would be to restrict the ability of agents to travel by retracting visas. Agents are always presented as a huge problem, but they are actually a very small group of people orchestrating these arms deals, at least in Africa.

With particular reference to the security sector, how can the embedded corrupt networks that survived democratisation be tackled most effectively?

By going for the business interests.

When the Cold War ended in Africa, although a lot changed, the international businessmen didn’t change. They are the soft underbelly of corrupt networks. Hopefully we are seeing that they are starting to be tackled now. They are averse to publicity, jail cells and travel restrictions. These characters have to be undone for the issue of corrupt networks to be tackled effectively.

OECD prosecutions: Is the North getting tough with its exporting companies yet? Is it practicing what it preaches?

No. But they are thinking about it more seriously than ever before; the amount of discussion is much greater. The issue is not really the defence companies, it’s the agents. Governments have a new interest in the issue because of the war on terror, though anti-corruption was not the original intention.

On mutual legal assistance, are developed countries doing all they can to help repatriate funds and extradite corrupt leaders?

This is an issue they are taking more seriously than before. The challenge is to invest resources in developed countries to help. The North is overwhelmed with requests from the South. More capacity is required.

What role can donors and international development agencies play to help reduce corruption in the defence and security sector in Africa?

A start would be to recognise the problem exists. Not taking this area seriously, because of sovereignty issues, means not addressing the biggest problem. Where corruption is concerned, security sector is the elephant in the room. They think, “That is the one thing we can’t look at”

What is your assessment of the new UK ECGD anti-corruption guidelines?

The key issue I always go back to – whether it’s a joint venture partner or an agent, especially in the South – is that agents are always the Achilles heel of these restrictions. Having said that, any tightening of the rules is welcome. But some key companies will only go kicking and screaming – it will be blow by blow.

What does a defence anti-corruption consortium need to be most effective?

This initiative is potentially very significant. It represents the first time these companies have come together to address the issue. It is timely to do so before something bites them in the hand.

Post 9/11 there has been a strong focus on money laundering. It would be good if defence industry continues to engage on these issues before the next tragedy or embarrassment occurs. It is most important that Eastern European and Chinese firms be included. In cases where the OECD companies have gone into joint ventures in the South with non-OECD companies it is crucial this issue is dealt with.