But in an increasing number of countries the opposite is becoming the case.  Defence Ministries no longer accept corruption as a ‘given’; no longer accept that 20 to 50% of the acquisition budget will be diverted; no longer accept that secrecy can be allowed to conceal scandalous maladministration.

And they have some powerful assets and levers they can use:

• The armed forces are often well respected in the country.  This is a motivational ‘well’ that can be a force for reform
• Military organisations are hierarchical.  Sometimes this is a negative force.  But it is also a positive one: the organisation will accept clear reforms from the top of the hierarchy in a more disciplined way than other civilian departments of government
• In the same way, it can be easier to discipline MOD officials and armed forces officers through the military structure than through civilian courts
• Defence Departments are usually quite centralised: once a change has been agreed, eg to greater procurement transparency, the change can be put properly into effect much more easily than in decentralised departments
• Defence Departments deal with a relatively small number of contractors.  These contractors also only have the MOD as a customer, so will accept reforms in order to stay a supplier

A simple check list of starting points for a reformist Defence Department includes the following:

• Talk openly about the need to address corruption, and the benefits to be gained from building integrity.  Bring your staff and officers on board first
• Make a thorough diagnosis of the key problems and then focus on solutions
• Use the two themes of ‘Building integrity’ and ‘Transparency’
• Take action even if other ministries are reluctant. The defence ministry can benefit from reform even without cross government consensus
• Engage civil society, even if initially they are suspicious of you
• Find ways within the hierarchy to investigate and sanction corrupt defence officials and officers
• Actively engage defence suppliers to assist.  Require them all to have strong compliance programmes
• Declare that secrecy categories will no longer be used except in the most pressing circumstances.  Publish as much of the defence business and costs as possible
• Demand much more disclosure by suppliers in the use of agents and intermediaries
• Challenge the requirements for offsets.  If they are still to be used, insist on much more rigour in setting them up, supervising them throughout their life, and disclosing progress
• Make use of anti-corruption expertise from Transparency International, international lending banks and organisations like NATO and the AU